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NOTE
CONFIDENCE IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR THROUGH
SARBANES-0XLEY-STYLE REFORMS
Joseph Mead*

Over the past several years, the nonprofit sector suffered a series of
highly visible scandals that shook the public's confidence in chari
table organizations. Concerned politicians and nonprofit leaders
responded with a variety of reforms inspired by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. The Note focuses on three such reforms: requiring nonprofit of
ficers certify financial statements, mandating audits of nonprofits'
financial statements, and imposing independent audit committees
on nonprofit boards of directors. This Note argues that, contrary to
the conclusions ofmany commentators, these reforms will provide a
net benefit to the nonprofit sector by increasing donor confidence
while imposing minimal costs.
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If Americans cannot trust their charities, they will stop giving and those in
need will suffer.'
INTRODUCTION
2

There are over one million nonprofits in the United States, and these or
ganizations play a tremendous role in American society. Charities improve
the lives of disadvantaged individuals. Religious organizations give people a
sense of meaning. Voluntary associations provide opportunities for camara
derie.
Commensurate with the importance of nonprofit organizations, American
participation in philanthropy is overwhelming. In recent years, nonprofit or
ganizations reported over $1.5 trillion in revenue to the Internal Revenue
3
Service ("IRS"). Nearly ninety percent of American households donate
4
money to charity, contributing an average of $1,620 per year. And in 2000,
over eighty-million adults volunteered their time, donating over an esti
5
mated $200 billion in free services.

1. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities:
Hearing of the S. Comm. on Fin., I08th Cong. 7 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] (statement of
Mark Everson, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Service).
2. According to the Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics ("NCCS"), in
2006 there were 1,478,194 nonprofits registered with the Internal Revenue Service within the past
two years. NCCS-Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States 1996-2006, http://
nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile 1.php?state=us (last visited Nov. IO, 2007). Of these, ap
proximately two-thirds (1,014, 165) were religious, educational, charitable, scientific, or literary
organizations governed by § 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See id.
3. See id. (follow "50l(c)(3) Public Charities" hyperlink); id. (follow "50l(c)(3) Private
Foundations" hyperlink); id. (follow "Other 50l(c) Nonprofit Organizations" hyperlink).
4. INDEP. SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2001), available
at http://www.independentsector.org/pdfs/gvOI keyfind.pdf. These data are for the year 2000.

5.

Id. at 2.
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Recently, however, the public has begun to perceive nonprofit organiza
6
tions as being ineptly or corruptly managed. Following the lead of federal
7
legislation addressing corporate-mismanagement scandals, many proposed
similar state and federal legislation and voluntary standards for the nonprofit
8
sector. Legal commentators are universally critical of these reforms. This
Note answers many of these criticisms by providing new empirical argu
9
ments in support of the legislation. It reviews and analyzes the reform
proposals and concludes that these proposals will improve the nonprofit sec
tor. Part I explains the scandals that undermined public perception of
nonprofits and the reforms proposed to restore public confidence. Part II
argues that the reforms would impose only modest costs on nonprofits. Fi
nally, Part III contends that the reforms would ultimately improve donor
confidence.
I.

THE "CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE"

10

AND THE RESULTING REFORMS

Widely publicized scandals over the past several years have led to di
minished public confidence in nonprofit organizations. Section I.A describes
how scandals involving national organizations such as the Red Cross, the
United Way, and the Nature Conservancy shook public perception of non
profits. Section J.B. discusses how various legislatures and nonprofit leaders
proposed reforming financial practices to reassure donors and restore faith
in the nonprofit sector. Borrowing heavily from Sarbanes-Oxley, these re
forms included mandatory management-officer certification of financial
statements, the creation of audit committees, and general auditing require
ments by independent auditors.

6.

See infra Section I.A.

7. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523-24 (2005).
8. Ronald Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms in the Charitable Sector: Can
Increased Disclosure of Information be Utilized Effectively?, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 447 (2006);
Robert W. Friz & Elizabeth Virgin, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act-Considerations for Nonprofit Health
Care Organizations, HEALTH L., June 2006, at l; Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the Goose
ls Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981
(2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2004) [hereinafter Reiser, Enron.org]; Dana
Brakman Reiser, There Ought to be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals
for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 559 (2005) [hereinafter Reiser, There Ought]; Wendy
K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good (And Bad) Governance: Applying The Sarbanes-Oxley Act to
Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303; Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-Profit Scandal in
the Nonprofit World: Should States Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corpora
tions?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831 (2007); Jane Heath, Comment, Who's Minding the Nonprofit Store:
Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have Anything to Offer Nonprofits?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 781 (2004).
9. This Note, as well as the other commentary, raises many empirical questions that can
only be resolved with data. Hopefully future research in this field will develop more concrete data
that will lead to more informed policymaking.
10. 2004 Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking Member, S.
Fin. Comm.).
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A. The Scandals
In the years leading up to the proposed reforms, scandals affecting
highly visible nonprofits captured the public's interest. One of the most pub
licized scandals involved the handling of donations by the Red Cross
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although many do
nors intended to help the victims of the terrorist attacks, the Red Cross
funneled their donations to other operations.'' After media-fueled outrage
over the scandal, the Red Cross apologized and changed the way it used
12
those funds. According to one survey, a higher percentage of Americans
13
paid attention to this scandal than the Enron bankruptcy.
Like the Red Cross, the United Way recently endured widely publicized
scandals. The United Way of the National Capital Area (which covers the
14
Washington D.C. area) fell victim to financial mismanagement when the
CEO of the organization took $1.5 million in "questionable payments," in
cluding advances on salary and undocumented reimbursements, from 1987
15
to 2001. Some board members knew of the suspicious behavior but failed
16
to alert the entire board or otherwise correct the situation. When the scan
dal broke in 2002, donations to the local charity dropped sixty percent, from
11
$45 million to $18 million. Contemporary high-profile scandals at other
United Way chapters, such as the 2002 discovery of the embezzlement of $2
18
million from the chapter based in Lansing, Michigan, led many to question
19
United Way chapters around the country.
Other nonprofit financial scandals bombarded the public during this
time. For example, Congress began investigating the "world's largest envi
ronmental organization," the Nature Conservancy, for improper land deals
20
that benefited "insiders." In California, legislators were concerned when
Aaron Tonken, a Hollywood fundraiser, pleaded guilty to diverting $7 mil

11.

Mark O' Keefe, For charities, bad year beginning to hit home, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002.

12. Paul C. Light, Opinion, The Red Cross is No Enron, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 6,
2002, at 9.
13. Id. ("According to a Brookings Institution survey conducted in December 2001, 60 per
cent of Americans said they were following the Red Cross story very or fairly closely, placing it
ahead of the death of former Beatie George Harrison and the Enron bankruptcy.").

14. See generally David C. Johnston, United Way Official Knew About Abuses, Memo Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, atA12.
15. Peter Whoriskey & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Charity Concealed Pilfering: Auditors Had
Flagged United Way Ex-Chief, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 2003, at 7.
16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18. Chris Andrews, United Way Recovers Most of its Stolen $2M, LANSING ST. J., July 8,
2005, at IB.
19. For example, a participant in the 2004 federal hearing relayed an anecdote where she
told her doctor she was testifying about "charity abuses" and her doctor immediately brought up
United Way. 2004 Hearing, supra note I, at 40 (statement of Ms. MacNab).
20. Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Senators Question Conservancy's Practices; End to
'Insider' and 'Side' Deals by Nonprofit Organizations ls Urged, WASH. PosT, June 8, 2005, at A3.
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21
lion of charitable donations to himself and his "associates." News articles
from 1995 to 2002 reported a total loss of $1.28 billion due to nonprofit
22
scandals during that period. Simultaneously, financial scandals in the cor
23
porate world, such as Enron, exacerbated the public's worries.
Public trust in nonprofit organizations waned as a result of these scan
dals. One survey found that confidence in nonprofits dropped from 90% to
24
60% between 2001 and 2002. Most of this distrust stemmed from how
nonprofits handled money. In 2006, 71 % of those surveyed said that non
25
profits waste a great deal or a fair amount of money. While 30% of the
survey participants thought that charities did a very good job helping people,
26
only 11 % thought they did a good job spending money wisely. This dis
trust manifested itself in part in the increasing number of individuals
choosing to create private foundations rather than trust preexisting organiza
tions.27
28
Influenced by media coverage of the "bad apples," many donors con
29
cluded that the entire nonprofit sector was corrupt. When nonprofits with a
strong national name such as the Red Cross are tainted, the effects of the
scandal reverberate. Indeed, the two strongest predictors of an individual's
confidence in the nonprofit sector are that individual's confidence in the Red
21. See Leora Gershenzon, Bill Analysis, SB 1262, at 5-6 (Cal. 2004), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_l 251- l 300/sb_ l 262_cfa_20040621_ 122508_asm_
comm.html (last visited Nov. IO, 2007). See also Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of
Cal., Attorney General Lockyer Unveils Reforms to Toughen Nonprofit Accountability, Fund
raiser Controls (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/release.php?id=
584&year=2004& month=2 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). At the same time in California, the col
lection agency for the Los Angeles United Way, Pipe Vine, could not account for all the donations
it received. See generally Heath, supra note 8, at 787-90.
22. Brad Wolverton, Charity Fraud Exceeds $/ Billion, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 27,
2003, at 26; Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of
Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper
No. 20, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=45 l 240.
23. See Carol Graham et al., Cooking the Books: The Cost to the Economy, PoL'Y BRIEF
(Brookings Inst., Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2002, at I, available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/
policybriefs/pbl 06.pdf (estimating that corporate scandals, including Enron and WorldCom, cost the
United States economy $35 billion in 2002 due to investor panic); Paul C. Light, Confidence in
Charitable Organizations, RES. BRIEF (Organizational Performance Initiative, New York, N.Y.),
Aug. 2006, at 2, available at http://wagner.nyu.edu/performance/confidence/charities06.pdf (attrib
uting the decline in confidence to for-profit scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and Martha
Stewart).
24. PAUL C. LIGHT, N.Y. UNIV. & BROOKINGS INST., FACT SHEET ON THE CONTINUED CRI
SIS IN CHARITABLE CONFIDENCE I (2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/
light/20040913.pdf.
25.

Light, supra note 23, at 2.

26.

Id.

27.

2004 Hearing, supra note I, at 40 (testimony of Mr. Adkisson).

28. Id. (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking Member, S. Fin. Comm.) ("Are the good
guys getting a bad name? Do you find that confidence in charitable giving is starting to decline
because it is known that there are a lot of bad apples?").
29. A similar phenomenon was observed in the public reaction to corporate scandals. See
Graham et al., supra note 23, at 2 ("Part of the problem stems from the public perception that the
[Enron] scandal is situated at the center rather than the periphery of the system.").
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30

Cross and United Way. Whether justified or not, this perception led to calls
for nonprofit-sector reform.
B. The Reforms
Over the past four years, state attorneys general and nonprofit-sector
leaders have suggested nonprofit reforms. At the federal level, the Senate
Committee on Finance produced both a "staff discussion draft" paper to
31
assist the committee in formulating "possible legislation" and a bill that
32
34
33
died in committee. Meanwhile, several states considered or adopted
their own reforms. The nonprofit community simultaneously suggested vol
35
untary reforms, in part to stave off more stringent, mandatory regulation.
The nonprofit-reform proposals focused primarily on improving disclo
36
sure by incorporating Sarbanes-Oxley-style provisions. Section I.B.1
describes efforts to improve the accuracy of annual reports. These proposals
would make the nonprofit CEO responsible for the accuracy of such reports.
Section l.B.2 discusses new proposed requirements that would increase the
thoroughness of annual-report audits. Section l.B.3 details the mandates
requiring structural or governance changes to the board of directors.
1. Proposed Certification Requirements Mirror Sarbanes-Oxley
Several nonprofit reforms mimic Sarbanes-Oxley's officer-certification
requirements. SOX mandates that a corporate CEO and CFO certify that the
periodic financial reports "fairly present in all material respects the financial
37
condition" of the company. The officer must also certify that effective in
38
ternal controls are in place. Similarly, several nonprofit reforms would
require an organization principal to certify reports. The Senate Finance
Committee Staff proposal closely mirrors Sarbanes-Oxley's certification
provision. It requires that the CEO certify that the nonprofit has "processes

30.

Light, supra note 23, at 6.

31. Staff Discussion Draft, Senate Fin. Comm. 1 (2004),
finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf.
32.

available

at http://

CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. (2003).

33. Such reforms were considered in Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1983 nn.9-11.
34. Such reforms were adopted in California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and West
Virginia. Id. at 1983 n.12.
35. See BoARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2006), available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/
sarbanesoxley.pdf.
36. Sarbanes-Oxley does not, by its terms, apply to nonprofit organizations--except in two
relatively minor ways. First, all organizations, including nonprofits, are prohibited from retaliating
against whistleblowers. Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 845 n.100. Second, nonprofits are required to
retain documents if needed in a federal investigation. Id. at 845 n.101
37.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. III 2003).

38.

Id.
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and procedures" that ensure accurate reporting and that the CEO "[be] pro
vided reasonable assurance of the accuracy and completeness of all material
39
aspects of the return." Similarly, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, a coali
40
tion spearheaded by the Independent Sector at the behest of the Senate
Finance Committee, recommended that the IRS require either the CEO or
41
CFO of a nonprofit to sign Form 990 statements under penalty of perjury
42
to attest that they are "true, correct, and complete." The Panel stopped
short of suggesting 'I: required statement on the sufficiency of internal con
trols.43 In its voluntary standards, the Independent Sector encourages CEOs
and CFOs to "fully understand such reports and make sure they are accurate
44
and complete" but stops short of recommending that they certify them.
State attorneys general have also proposed legislation requiring officer
certification. Like the federal government, however, states have been hesi
tant to adopt this requirement. In 2003, Eliot Spitzer, then attorney general
of New York, proposed legislation that adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley officer
45
certification requirements wholesale for large nonprofits. The legislation
also would have required a statement regarding the sufficiency of internal
controls of large nonprofits, while requiring less of officers of smaller non
profits.46 However, when the legislature did not share his enthusiasm, Spitzer
47
removed this provision from his revised proposal. Instead, the legislation
clarifies that a failure to file a "complete and accurate" report would be a
48
violation of the officer's fiduciary duty. Likewise, the attorney general of
Massachusetts originally proposed a requirement that both the CEO and the
chair of the board of directors of nonprofits with revenue over $100,000

39.

Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 31, at 8.

40. The Independent Sector is an umbrella organization of over 500 nonprofits with a
mission to "lead[], strengthen[], and mobilize[] the charitable community in order to fulfill our
vision of a just and inclusive society and a healthy democracy of active citizens, effective institu
tions, and vibrant communities." Independent Sector, About Us, http://www.independentsector.org/
about/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
41.

Form 990 is a statement of certain financial information that nonprofits must file with the

IRS.
42.
PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, )NDEP. SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY,
GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 26, 29 (June 2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/
Panel_Final_Report.pdf [hereinafter PANEL REPORT].
43.

Id.

44.

BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 35, at 7.

45.

Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 570; Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1304.

46.

Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 570; Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1304.

See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 571; see also LEGISLATIVE BILL DRAFTING
47.
COMM'N, No. 07612-02-5, AN ACT TO AMEND THE NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW AND RE
LIGIOUS CORPORATIONS LAW, IN RELATION TO PROTECTIONS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD AND
ABUSE (2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char_pdf/ag68-05.pdf (drafted at the
request of the Attorney General).
Assemb. B. 7825, 228th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (referred to Senate Committee
48.
on Rules on June 19, 2006).
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49

certify the accuracy of financial statements. However, the state legislature
rejected this proposed legislation.so
2. Proposed Audit-Committee Oversight ofAuditing Work also
Mirrors Sarbanes-Oxley Requirements

Like Sarbanes-Oxley, proposed nonprofit reforms also address the impor
tance of having a thorough, independent audit. Sarbanes-Oxley dictates
1
independence requirements for the audit committees of public companies.s
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit committee "plays a critical role in providing
oversight over and serving as a check and balance on a company's financial
2
reporting system."s The committee is charged with the "appointment, com
pensation, and oversight" of the company's auditor.s 3 Each member of the
4
audit committee must be an independent director.s Additionally, each audit
committee must have at least one member who is a financial expert or provide
reasons why there is not such an expert.ss Finally, an audit committee should
establish a mechanism for anonymous reporting of "questionable accounting
6
or auditing matters."s When no separate audit committee is formed, the entire
board is charged with the duties of an audit committee, subject to the stringent
audit-committee requirements.s 7
Many nonprofit-reform proposals impose Sarbanes-Oxley-style audit
committee requirements on large nonprofits. Like Sarbanes-Oxley, audit
committee responsibilities under the reforms include decisions regarding hir
ing, firing, and supervising the auditor and otherwise "satisfy[ing] it[self] ...
that the financial affairs of the corporation are in order."ss Reforms also im

49. An Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public Charities, H.B. 4347, 184th Gen.
Court (Mass. 2005).
50.

Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 564.

51. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I (Supp. III 2003); SEC Listing
Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOA-3 (2005); SEC Standards Relating to
Listed Company Auditing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 240, 249, 274).
52.
18,789.
53.

SEC Standards Relating to Listed Company Auditing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.

54. Id. Independence means not being "affiliated" with the company other than as a director
or receiving compensation from the company other than for service on the board. Id.
55.

Id. § 407.

56.

Id. § 301.

57. SEC Standards Relating to Listed Company Auditing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at
18,790 ("If the entire board constitutes the audit committee, the new SRO rules adopted under
Exchange Act Rule lOA-3, including the independence requirements, will apply to the issuer's
board as a whole.").
58.

CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12586(e)(2) (West 2005).
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pose independence requirements on audit-committee members identical to
59
those of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Despite these similarities, there are a few notable differences between the
nonprofit audit committees and those required by Sarbanes-Oxley. First, no
nonprofit reform requires that a financial expert be placed on the audit com
60
mittee, though one reform suggests "includ[ing] individuals with some
61
financial literacy ... as a matter of recommended practice." Second, the New
York law, for example, would have allowed a nonprofit to opt out of the audit
committee requirements by amending its bylaws-the reforms do not require
an audit committee if the certificate of incorporation or bylaws prohibit the
62
creation of such a committee. Third, the reforms depart from Sarbanes
Oxley by not requiring that members of the audit committee be members of
the board, provided that at least half of the audit committee is composed of
63
board members. Finally, as Table 1 illustrates, all audit-committee reforms
are only mandatory for large nonprofits.
TABLE I

Reform

Independent Sector voluntary standard
California Nonprofit Integrity Act
Massachusetts bill
New York bill

Threshold to Implicate Audit
Committee Requirements
(Annual Revenue)
All organizations that conduct outside audits"
$2 million 65
$500,00066
$2 million67

Despite important differences, both Sarbanes-Oxley and the nonprofit re
forms require an independent audit committee to ensure that the auditor is not

59. See id. § 12586(e)(2) ("The audit committee may include persons who are not members
of the board of directors, but the member or members of the audit committee shall not include any
members of the staff, including the president or chief executive officer and the treasurer or chief
financial officer.").
60.

Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 8, at 261 & n.213.

61.

PANEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 79.

62. S.B. 4836-B, § 4, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2004) (proposing N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 7 l 2(g)).
63. E.g., Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, S.B. 1262, § 7, 2003--04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2004) (codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12586); An Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public
Charities, H.B. 4347, § 4(a), 184th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005).
64.

BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 35, at 4.

65.

CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12586.

66.

Mass. H.B. 4347, § 3(g); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §SF (2002).

67. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B, § 4 (proposing N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 712(g)(I)). An earlier version of the
New York bill would have set the standard at $1 million in revenue or $3 million in assets. Mulligan,
supra note 8, at 1992-93 (citing N.Y. S.B. 4836-B, § 4).
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beholden to staff and effectively scrutinizes the financial condition of the or
•
•
68
garuzat1on.
3. Proposed Requirements Reflect Sarbanes-Oxley's Emphasis
on the Importance ofAuditing
The proposed nonprofit reforms reflect the importance of auditing by call
69
ing for regular audits by independent auditors. Sarbanes-Oxley does not
impose an auditing requirement on for-profit corporations because these cor
porations were required to prepare audited statements before Sarbanes
Oxley. 70 However, many of Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms were motivated by the
importance of thorough, accurate audits by impartial auditors in avoiding fi
71
nancial mismanagement. Auditing requirements strive to improve nonprofit
governance by applying Sarbanes-Oxley-style concerns to nonprofit organiza
tions, in particular large organizations. For example, California law imposes
auditing requirements and requires that the auditor maintain its independence
as defined by the Comptroller General's Government Auditing Standards and
72
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. Many nonprofit reforms
are based on a two-tiered auditing requirement; depending on the size of the
organization, requirements differ.
TABLE 2

Reform

Nonprofit Panel proposed reform73
Committee Staff proposed reform"
Independent Sector voluntary standard"
California Nonprofit Integrity Act'0

68.

Threshold to File
a Report from an
Independent Accountant
$250,000
$100,000
$250,000
-

Threshold for a Full
Audit of Financial
Statements
$1 million
$250,000
$1 million
$2 million

See Cal. S.B. 1262, § 6.

69. Massachusetts had this idea long before Sarbanes-Oxley, imposing a two-tiered auditing
requirement on nonprofit organizations since the late 1970s. Ch. 12, § SF. Organizations with annual
revenue over $500,000 must undergo a full audit, while organizations with annual revenue between
$100,000 and $500,000 must obtain an "independent certified public accountant's review report." Id.
70. See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 573 (citing SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 210.3-01to210.3-20 (2004)).
71. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l (Supp. III 2003) (legislat
ing auditor independence).
72.

Cal. S.B. 1262, § 7(e)(l); see also PANEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 80.

73.

PANEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 5.

74.

Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 31, at 9.

75.

BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 35, at 3-4.

76.

Cal. S.B. 1262, § 6.
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Table 2 illustrates the centrality of the auditing requirements to the re
form proposals: organizations with revenue as low as $100,000 would have
to file a report on their financial statements prepared by an independent ac
countant, while full audits would be required of organizations with revenue
as low as $250,000.
II. THE

REFORMS ARE NOT EXCESSIVELY COSTLY

This Part responds to common criticisms of proposals calling for the
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley-style reforms in the nonprofit sector. Section II.A
argues that Sarbanes-Oxley-modeled reforms generally may be justified in the
nonprofit sector because, perhaps unlike the corporate sector, the benefits of
such reforms may outweigh the costs. Section 11.B details how the potential
costs of each of the reforms actually proposed--officer-certification, audit
committee, and auditing requirements-are insignificant compared with po
tential benefits. This Part concludes that neither Sarbanes-Oxley-style
reforms generally nor nonprofit-reform proposals specifically are likely to
impose excessive costs.
A. In General, the Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley-Inspired
Reforms Outweigh the Costs in the Nonprofit Sector
Critics of the reforms lament the financial costs that the reforms will im
77
pose, but such concerns are misguided. Pointing to the expense of Sarbanes
Oxley, critics argue that the financial costs to a resource-scarce sector will be
crippling, diverting funds away from the nonprofit's mission and potentially
78
reducing its provision of services. As evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley-style
reforms are too expensive for the nonprofit sector, one commentator notes that
Sarbanes-Oxley caused many smaller corporations to go private to avoid the
79
costs of compliance and argues that "[i]f small for-profit companies find
the Act's burdens to be prohibitively expensive, it can be predicted that
80
many smaller nonprofits would reach the same conclusion."
77. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, has been strongly criticized as being far too expensive,
perhaps even causing some smaller corporations to withdraw from public stock markets. Szymanski,
supra note 8, at 1318. One study places the net private cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley at
$1.4 trillion. Special Report: A Price Worth Paying?: Auditing Sarbanes-Oxley, EcoNOMIST, May
21, 2005, at 82. Others suggest that large firms spend an average of 70,000 additional man-hours to
comply with Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements. Id.
78. John Boudreau, Bill Expands Accountability for Charities, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS,
Sept. 2, 2004, at 3C (noting criticism of California's bill by nonprofits); Signing Statement, Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger (Oct. I, 2004) (on file with author) ("[W)hile I support transparency, account
ability and curbing unscrupulous activities, I encourage the Legislature to ensure the non-profit
community is not subjected to needless bureaucracy thereby potentially hampering the work and
contributions made by non-profits who are serving California communities in need.").
79. See generally Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private
Decisions, 4 J. AccT. & ECON. 116 (2007) (discussing the benefits of going private).
80. Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1318. Another commentator has noted that for-profit corpo
rations ha~e the option of going private to avoid regulation, an option not available to nonprofits.
Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 849-50.
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In contrast to the corporate sector, the benefits of such proposals may
outweigh the costs in the nonprofit sector, and many nonprofits are voluntar
81
ily assuming additional obligations. For-profit corporations' responses to
Sarbanes-Oxley, with the singular goal of improving their financial condi
tion, do not necessarily imply that similar nonprofit reforms are
prohibitively expensive. The nonprofit sector does not share the same mar
ket-driven, self-executing accountability mechanisms as the for-profit sector.
Nonprofits lack three accountability reinforcements, thus rendering the
usual market forces inadequate: stakeholder self-interest (and therefore in
centives to monitor); intense, efficiency-forcing competition; and a common
82
metric of success (profit). Because existing accountability measures have
failed to deter violations or bolster their image, nonprofits have found addi
tional accountability measures necessary in order to meet the demands of
their donors and stakeholders alike. Recognizing that they are more vulner
able to mismanagement than the corporate world and that they are
83
accountable to a greater number of stakeholders, nonprofits are voluntarily
incorporating Sarbanes-Oxley principles at a rate higher than for-profit or
84
ganizations not directly covered by the law.
Not only does voluntary compliance suggests that the cost-benefit analy
sis in the nonprofit sector is different than in the corporate sector, but
nonprofits' access to lower-cost labor evidences the extent to which the cost
of reform proposals may be limited. Nonprofits have access to a key re
85
source that for-profit corporations do not: pro bono professionals. While
nonprofits may not have a preexisting infrastructure for regulatory compli
ance,86 they may have access to free or reduced-price professional assistance
to improve their organizational accountability. With the ability to harness the
work product of charitably minded professionals, nonprofits can undertake
81. Unfortunately, providing a net benefit to the sector does not necessarily mean that each
individual nonprofit will benefit. It is possible that some will have to bear costs that exceed their
own benefit. This imbalance may cause some nonprofits to reduce services or shut down completely.
For example, nonprofits that do not generally receive donations will not benefit from a boost in
donor confidence. Whether some nonprofits are more severely impacted than others is a concern,
and legislatures should monitor such effects.
82. J. GREGORY DEES ET AL., ENTERPRISING NONPROFITS: A Toot.KIT FOR SOCIAL ENTRE
PRENEURS 105 (2001).
83. Stakeholders include donors, beneficiaries, and the general public. The conventional
wisdom is that corporations are accountable primarily to shareholders only.
84. PAUL D. BROUDE, THE IMPACT OF SARBANES-0Xt.EY ON PRIVATE & NONPROFIT COM
PANIES IO (2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUploadl 37/3511/
ndi%202006%20private%20study.pdf (attributing nonprofits' willingness to incorporate Sarbanes
Oxley principles to the fact that they have a "greater number of stakeholders to whom they are ac
countable"). The study found, for example, that ninety percent of nonprofits surveyed implemented
or planned to implement independent-director requirements and ninety-seven percent of nonprofits
utilize audit-committee oversight of auditors. Id.
85. See. e.g., Ariz. Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants, ASCPA: Find a CPA: Request a CPA
for Pro Bono Nonprofit Work, http://www.ascpa.com/public/findacpa/request_for_pro_bono.aspx
(last visited Nov. IO, 2007) (offering to connect nonprofits with volunteer CPAs).
86. See Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 848-49; see also id. at 835-43 (discussing the limited
prereform nonprofit-accountability mechanisms).
·
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some tasks at much lower cost than their for-profit counterparts. This further
compels the conclusion that Sarbanes-Oxley accountability measures are
87
more appropriate in the nonprofit sector than for some businesses.

B. The Benefits of the Specific Nonprofit-Reform Proposals
Similarly Outweigh the Costs
Critics overstate the potential costs as compared to the benefits of the
proposed reforms detailed in Section LB. They point out that certification
provisions require officers to spend more time verifying their financial in
88
formation and less time on their other duties. Some argue that such
89
constraints on an officer's time may necessitate additional staff. Alterna
tively, the officer may be required to work longer hours and may demand
additional compensation for this additional work. The nonprofit may have to
choose between paying the officer more for his or her increased workload
and paying an additional employee to perform the job functions the officer
is no longer able to perform.
However, it is not clear that the additional time commitment will create
a dearth of individuals willing to accept positions as officers in nonprofit
organizations. In fact, many nonprofits have voluntarily adopted officer
certification requirements for their organizations, suggesting that the costs
imposed by the reforms are outweighed by benefits. One recent survey
found that eighty-one percent of surveyed nonprofits had either their board
90
chair or CEO sign Form 990 statements.
Charging board members on an audit committee with greater responsibil
ity will not scare away all individuals from board service. Some have
argued that the increased responsibility the audit-committee reforms would
impose "may make it more difficult to recruit volunteers" for nonprofit
91
boards. In the for-profit world, the added responsibility imposed by
92
Sarbanes-Oxley led to large increases in director pay. In the nonprofit world,
87. There is an intuitive argument that for-profit organizations "can more readily absorb
additional costs because they can pass on compliance costs to customers or raise capital in other
ways" not available to nonprofits. Id. at 849. Yet costs do not just disappear for a for-profit entity. A
business that cannot justify the costs of its existence to investors or consumers will shut down as
readily as a nonprofit that cannot similarly convince donors and foundations.
88. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 586. An officer of a nonprofit already has to sign
Form 990 under perjury. The reforms differ in that they place the burden on senior management
the CEO, CFO, or chair of the board of directors.
89.

See id.

90. Lester M. Salamon & Stephanie L. Geller, Nonprofit Govemance and Accountability,
COMMUNIQUE (Ctr. for Civil Soc'y Studies at the John Hopkins Univ. Inst. for Policy Studies,
Baltimore, Md.), Oct. 2005, at I, 5 (2005), available at http://www.allianceonline.org/publications/
listening__post_communique_2.file.
91.

Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 596.

92. One survey finds between a fifty-eight percent and seventy-one percent increase in director
pay over the period between 2001 and 2005. THOMAS E. HARTMAN, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN
THE ERA OF SARBANES-OXLEY 10 (2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_
s31Publications/FileUpload137/3420/ndi%202006%20public%20study%20FINAL.pdf.
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by contrast, directors are typically unpaid volunteers recruited more for their
93
fundraising potential than financial prowess. Without being compensated for
their work, they may be especially sensitive to new burdens placed on their
94
time, particularly tedious audit-oversight duties. However, the fact that these
directors contribute time with minimal or no expectation of payment may
suggest an especially strong commitment to the organization's mission and a
lack of sensitivity to additional burdens on their time. Moreover, the accom
panying prestige and other rewards of serving as a director for a well
respected nonprofit offset worries about an additional time commitment. Thus
nonprofit directors will not decline to serve merely because they may be re
95
quired to serve on an audit committee with increased responsibility.
Finally, the auditing requirements are tailored to the ability of the non
96
profit to afford such audits. One commentator estimates that it will cost
"close to $10,000" to comply with the auditing requirements, or approxi
97
mately 4% of a smaller organization's annual revenue. However, the
98
auditing requirements only apply to relatively large nonprofits. Nonprofits
choosing to voluntarily undergo an audit spend no more than 1% of overall
revenue on the audit, and most spend far less. Nonprofits with annual reve
nue between $2 million to $3.8 million spend an average of 0.37% of
revenue on audits, while nonprofits with revenue between $4 million and $9
99
million spend only 0.26%. And perhaps the strongest evidence of the rela
tive cost of the audit requirements is that 97% of nonprofits audit their
financial reports, "even though only 40 percent of the organizations reported
100
being aware of a state requirement to be audited."

Ill. THE

REFORMS CREATE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS
FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR

The reforms will benefit the nonprofit sector by increasing financial ac
countability and improving donor confidence. tot Section III.A argues that the
93.

Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1987-88.

94.

See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 596.

95. One commentator actually advocates granting standing to a greater number of people to
increase the number of lawsuits against nonprofit directors. Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 853. This ap
proach would undoubtedly exacerbate the worry that directors would decline positions because
exposing them to additional liability will certainly cause more fear than the simple imposition of addi
tional duties.
96.

Szymanski. supra note 8, at 1318; Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 594.

97.

Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1318.

98.

See supra Section LB.

99.

PANEL REPORT,

100.

supra note 42, at 36, n.3 (citing a United Way survey).

Salamon & Geller, supra note 90, at 5.

I 0 I. Some critics argue that the reforms are inappropriate because they focus too narrowly on
financial accountability instead of mission accountability. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1991; Reiser,
Enron.org, supra note 8, at 212-15. However, the focus on financial accountability over mission ac
countability is appropriate. After all, the reforms are trying to alleviate a perceived financial crisis in the
sector. See supra Section I.A. Further, it is easier to create legislative enactments targeting financial
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reforms will benefit the nonprofit sector by improving nonprofit financial
practices, either through donor enforcement of best practices or by reminding
nonprofit actors of their duties to run financially sound organizations. Alterna
tively, Section 111.B argues that even if the reforms do not actually improve
financial practices at any particular firm, they will nevertheless allay the con
cerns of nonprofit donors, thereby increasing revenue. Finally, Section III.C
suggests that voluntary compliance by some nonprofits is insufficient to solve
the problems of the nonprofit sector and that legislation is the most effective
means to accomplish these ends.
A. The Reforms Will Enhance Financial Management
The reforms will improve financial management of nonprofit organiza
tions in several ways. Section III.A. I argues that the reforms will improve
102
financial management by arming donors with better information. Section
IIl.A.2 argues that donors will use this enhanced information to monitor non
profits and demand better financial practices. Even if donors do not actually
use the information, Section IIl.A.3 argues that the reforms will improve fi
nancial management because nonprofit actors will either miscalculate the risk
of donor enforcement or voluntarily improve their behavior.
1. The Reforms are Tailored to Improve Data Disclosure
103

Assuming that nonprofits comply with them, the reforms will likely lead
104
to the release of more accurate financial data. The reforms provide a series
of safeguards designed to improve financial data, even catching willfully
bad acts. The CEO-certification requirement encourages officers to ensure that
financial data are accurately reported and ensures that sufficient internal
control processes are in place to catch financial mismanagement at lower lev
105
els of the organization. Requiring the CEO's signature on financial
accountability than other forms of accountability. Cf Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 8, at 227-28 (noting
that attorneys generally avoid enforcing mission accountability because mission creep is subtler and
less concrete and therefore more difficult to detect and prevent). Finally, financial abuse is easier to hide
than straying from one's mission. While financial data can be evaluated by objective standards, mis
sions are subjective, with one nonprofit's mission appealing to one person but not another. As a result,
nonprofits lack the same incentive to misstate their mission as to misstate their finances.
102. This requires both that nonprofits comply with the reforms' requirements and that the re
quirements are tailored to make disclosure more accurate rather than a pointless obstacle. A reform that
requires annual reports to be printed on pink sheets, for example, may be complied with and yet will
utterly fail to improve the data disclosed.
103. It will be relatively easy for state attorneys general to determine whether a nonprofit is in
compliance with these reform and to force compliance if not. Ascertaining whether a nonprofit com
plied with the auditing requirement is as simple as checking for an auditor's report. See Reiser, There
Ought, supra note 8, at 594.
I 04. Some have criticized the officer-certification requirements as providing no protection
against willfully misbehaving actors. Id. at 584, 590. Similarly, if the auditor is complicit with
management, abuses may not come to light. Id. at 594. Finally, a innocent yet financially inexpert
CEO or audit committee may comply with the additional duties but still fail to catch mistakes. Id. at
596.
105.

See supra Section J.B. I.

896

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:881

documents may increase enforcement by aiding prosecution against a ma
106
levolent CE0. Having a separate audit committee clarifies the financial
oversight responsibility of the committee's members. Finally, absent com
plicity, the outside auditor "should unearth at least some inaccuracies and
107
abuses that otherwise would go unnoticed."
2. Donors Will Use the Improved Data to
Force Improved Financial Management
108

Despite critics' assertions to the contrary, donors are likely to use the
enhanced data to force improved financial management. Sarbanes-Oxley is
premised on the view that the market for corporate shares is a sufficient
regulator of corporate governance if investors have sufficient financial in
1
formation. In contrast to the suggestion of critics, 0') the available evidence
suggests that donors do use financial data, and nonprofit organizations are
110
complying with this practice to increase fundraising capacity. Although
industry analysts are absent from the nonprofit world, organizations do col
lect and share nonprofit financial data. The existence of these organizations
suggests demand for their services. GuideStar, for example, is a nonprofit
that runs a database that contains financial information on more than
I 06. . See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. R.Ev. 937, 953 (2003) ("[T]he executive certification re
quirement [of Sarbanes-Oxley] will make it easier to establish fraudulent conduct if its effect is to
eliminate the defenses of lack of knowledge or good faith.").

107.

Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 594.

108.

Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1997-98; Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 603--05.

109. Critics question whether either donors or state attorneys general will use this data. This
Section concedes that reliance on state attorneys general for enforcement of better financial prac
tices would be misplaced. State attorneys general are burdened by a "legendary" lack of manpower
and a limited budget. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 598. For example, ten attorneys in
California's Office of the Attorney General are charged with overseeing 90,000 nonprofits across the
state. Erika Torres, Nonprofit audit act brings high-profile clash to O.C., ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(Santa Ana, Cal.), June 11, 2005. Even with proper funding, there remains the danger of "agency
capture" by relatively powerful nonprofits. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1997.
Two studies cited by critics of the reforms provide only extremely weak support for the proposi
tion that donors do not want better information. One study surveyed twenty-two individuals who
collectively donate $50 million per year to charities and found that only four were "strongly interested"
in getting better data on performance (not financial information) from nonprofits. Katie Cunningham &
Marc Ricks, Why Measure?, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2004, at 44, 46. Although limited
by its small sample size, the survey found that participants might reject an ill-fated attempt at quantify
ing mission success (for example, one metric defined success by an increa~e in the number of
volunteers) but still desire more objective financial information. See id. at 46, 49. Another study cited
by critics, DAVID M. VAN SLYKE & ARTHUR c. BROOKS, CMTY. FOUND. FOR GREATER ATLANTA, THE
POWER OF ONE: 2001 REPORT ON PERSONAL CHARITABLE GIVING IN GREATER ATLANTA (2001),
available at http://www.atlcf.org/Webdata/Documents/35/GivingStudyFinal.pdf, was not intended to
investigate this issue, and the little relevant evidence found in the study is contrary to the critics' claim.
For example, the study found that sixty-two percent of those who received information on how a dona
tion is used were likely to donate. Id. at 18. The study actually recommends that nonprofits take more
steps to share enhanced financial information with potential donors, for example, by creating a web
based nonprofit registry. Id. at 22.
110. One critic of nonprofit reforms notes the effectiveness of informal donor regulation, even
suggesting it as an alternative to other forms of regulation. Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 842, 853-54.
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1.7 million nonprofit organizations and is visited eight-million times annu
ally.111 Similarly, the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance certifies
112
nonprofits that meet its governance standards. In fact, 90,000 nonprofits
have voluntarily uploaded additional financial information to these data
113
bases to reach out to prospective donors. Ensuring the integrity of this data
is vital for the thousands of donors who rely on it when making decisions.
3. Nonprofit Financial Management Would Improve Even
if Donors Do Not Use Enhanced Disclosures
Even if donors and state actors do not rely on enhanced disclosure, the
reforms may still be beneficial. First, even if there is no real risk that the
financial data will lead to donor or government sanction, nonprofit actors
114
may mistakenly perceive such a risk and alter their behavior accordingly.
Thus even a willfully malicious actor may improve her behavior if she over
115
estimates the likelihood of enforcement.
Absent an actual risk, the reforms have an underappreciated communica
tive aspect that signals the importance of financial-data integrity. The laws
may be effective by causing nonprofit actors to internalize the concerns under
116
lying the reforms.
Diligent managers, cued by the reforms to treat
117
bookkeeping with heightened care, will avoid inadvertent rnismanagement.
The publicity generated by these laws, with the resulting dialogue on the
importance of solid finances, should inspire better financial oversight by
nonprofit managers.
B. The Refonns Will Alleviate the Concerns ofDonors
Regardless of the extent to which these reforms enhance financial prac
tices at a given nonprofit, the reforms will alleviate donors' concerns and

111. GuideStar.org, About GuideStar and Philanthropic Research, Inc., http://
www.guidestar.org/about/index.jsp?source=dnabout (last visited Nov. I0, 2007). Note that this is
despite the often incomplete and inaccurate data sought to be cured by the reforms.
112. Give.org, National Charity Seal Program, http://www.give.org/seal/abouttheseal.asp (last
visited Nov. 10, 2007).
113. Todd Cohen, Financial Disclosure Takes Root, Although Some Still Balk, NONPROFIT
TIMES, July I, 2005, at I, available at http://www.nptimes.com/Jul05/npt3.html.
114. Risks are often inaccurately estimated, and perceived risks drive behavior more than
actual risks. See, e.g., Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National
Survey, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 73, 80 (discussing the litigation risks involved with hospi
tals' voluntary disclosure of unexpected treatment outcomes).
115. See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 585 ("In the absence of clear and effective
penalties for noncompliance, a nonprofit officer envisioned as a Holmesian "bad man"-who fol
lows only law that predictably will be enforced against him-likewise would not change his
behavior ....").
116. This argument is bolstered by a common-sense notion that people who devote their time
and energy to nonprofit organizations are "good guys."
117. See Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 8, at 276--77 (proposing programs to train managers of
. nonprofits on the importance of accountability).
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therefore increase willingness to donate to nonprofits. A mistake often
made by the commentators is to conclude that donors will make donations
regardless of a nonprofit's financial integrity because they lack the incentive
119
to investigate the financial health of an organization prior to donating. To
the contrary, as a result of the information costs associated with determining
an individual nonprofit's financial integrity, some donors may stop donating
to even well-managed nonprofits because malfunctioning nonprofit organi
120
zations are most prominent in their minds. Just as defenders of corporate
reforms contend that Sarbanes-Oxley buoyed the investor confidence shaken
121
by Enron and other contemporary scandals, so too the nonprofit reforms
may improve donor confidence by improving access to financial data.
News stories surrounding the consideration and adoption of reforms will
122
combat the negative press that created the public distrust of charities. Fur
ther, nonprofits can utilize the reforms in fundraising material, noting the
123
systems in place to ensure sound financial management. Most importantly,
the reforms-particularly those mandated by legislation-provide a way for
"good" nonprofits to limit the damage caused by the "bad." By binding
themselves and nonprofits resistant to disclosure to sound practices, they
124
may avoid future scandals. News stories about a small number of actors
can taint the entire sector, and nonprofits concerned about donor distrust
need to demonstrate not only that they are trustworthy but that other non

118. One critic downplays the benefits that nonprofit reforms bestow. Gilkeson, supra note 8,
at 852. Essentially she argues that donors part with their money voluntarily and so have less interest
in how the money is spent than an investor in a business. Id. Further, "[b ]eneficiaries may be de
prived of a benefit, but it is not a benefit to which they are legally entitled." Id. Even assuming that
such a cramped definition of interest is appropriate, it overlooks the benefits raised in this Part.
119.

See Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1998-99.

120. For example, consider how public perception of the entire sector depended so much on
the image of a handful of high-profile nonprofits. See infra Part I.
121. See John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the Interna
tional Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 246-48 (2003); David Henry, Not
Everyone Hates SarbOx, BVSINESSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at 37 ("SarbOx and related reforms have
produced much more reliable corporate financial statements, which investors rely on when deciding
whether to buy or sell shares. For them, SarbOx has been a godsend.").
122. A search on LexisNexis "News, All" database for references to the California Nonprofit
Integrity Act showed forty-five hits that mention the act. Among these hits are an article in the New
York Times, which has a circulation over one million, and an article in the NonProfit Times,
which claims a readership of over 85,000 nonprofit executives. NonProfit Times, http://
www.nptimes.com/main/subscribe.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (providing NonProfit Times
circulation data); New York Times Company: Revenue & Circulation Data, http://www.nytco.com/
investors/financials/nyt-circulation.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (providing New York Times
circulation data); see also Mark Hrywna, Special Report: The Sky Isn't Falling: Fear of SOX is
Waning, NONPROFIT TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at 19; Bernard Stamler, After a Spate of Scandals, A De
bate on New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at F25. The press accounts tend to assume the
benefit of the reforms yet bemoan the cost.
123. For example, United Way and Red Cross have posted statements on accountability on
their web pages. Red Cross, Governance, http://www.redcross.org/services/governance/
0,1082,0_234_,00.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); United Way, Accountability, http://
national.unitedway.org/about/accountability.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
124.

See infra Section IIl.C.
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profits are as well. That some of the reforms are addressed only to larger
nonprofits suggests the importance of boosting confidence in the most visi
126
ble charities to maintain confidence across the entire sector.
C. Legislation ls the Most Effective Way
to Accomplish These Goals
The best way to accomplish the cost-effective reforms laid out above is
127
through mandatory regulation. If widely adopted, voluntary reforms will
prevent financial mismanagement but will not be fully effective in
128
preventing fraud or restoring donor confidence. If left as a best-practices
suggestion, the reforms may only be adopted by those nonprofits that are
already concerned about financial integrity. Those nonprofits that most need
tighter financial management are unlikely to adopt the voluntary proposals
because financial management is not a priority for them. Even "good"
nonprofits may suffer from an agency problem where the best-intentioned
nonprofit managers will be especially sensitive to the burdens of reforms
that accrue to them personally but less sensitive to the benefits that flow to
129
the organization as a whole. When a scandal develops at one of these

125. Cf Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 842 (noting that the media "focus[es] only on the largest
and most well-known charities and the worst offenders"). For example, the public's perception of
the nonprofit sector at large is tied closely to its perception of just a few, large charities. See supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
126. Thus it is really the smaller nonprofits that have yet to establish a reliable name for
themselves that· will benefit from increased confidence in the sector, without having to endure the
same costs as larger nonprofits.
127. Further, state-level regulation (as opposed to federal regulation) is more appropriate here
than it is in corporate reform. First, like for-profit entities, nonprofits are inherently creatures of state
law and have historically been regulated at the state level. Unlike for-profits entities, however, non
profits are less associated with commerce. (In fact, extensive federal regulation of nonprofits could
raise constitutional issues about exceeding federal authority under the commerce clause if such
regulation was not tied to the taxing power.) Moreover, unlike centrally managed corporations,
nonprofits tend to have a decentralized structure, with local affiliates in states possessing some
degree of autonomy from the national organization. Finally, although the scandals affecting the
corporate world were national in scope, many of the nonprofit scandals affected local nonprofit
affiliates and were covered primarily by the local press. In states where scandals have not been a big
concern, the legislature could enact reforms tailored to the fears of the local population.
128.

See supra Section 11.B.

129. This is analogous to Supreme Court cases that establish qualified immunity for certain
public officials for civil-rights violations but decline to extend immunity to municipal entities. The
Court reasoned that personal liability would distort decision making because although it amplifies
the cost of certain actions, the benefits of compliance are not directly experienced by the official.
Compare Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (denying personal liability because of the
"danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good"), with Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 653 n.37 (1980) ("[I]mposing personal liability on public officials could have an
undue chilling effect on the exercise of their decision-making responsibilities, but that no such per
nicious consequences were likely to flow from the possibility of a recovery from public funds.").
But see Owen, 445 U.S. at 668-69 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that "responsible" public officers
will be deterred the same regardless of whether the judgment comes from personal or municipal
funds).
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nonprofits, the resulting media attention damages the entire sector.
Mandatory legislation provides a way to prevent these nonprofits from
131
tainting the entire sector.
Further, legislatively imposed reforms are a more effective way of as
suaging the public's fears. It appears that the media is willing to focus its
attention on the bad acts of a single nonprofit, yet it apparently takes a ges
ture as dramatic and widespread as the California Nonprofit Integrity Act to
paint the sector in a positive light. The public may take better notice of leg
islation that changes the rules for a whole class of nonprofits than merely a
132
single nonprofit that changes policy. Legislation can be a tool for the non
profit sector to mitigate the damage caused by the "bad apples" while
generating increased confidence among potential donors.
CONCLUSION

Nonprofits serve a role far different from their corporate counterparts,
yet both the nonprofit and corporate sectors suffer from similar effects of
financial mismanagement. Preserving the vibrancy of nonprofits through
targeted reforms is vital to the millions of Americans who benefit from this
sector every day.
State legislatures should enact regulations to improve confidence in the
nonprofit sector because such trust is crucial for the sector's vitality and its
ability to obtain donations. The reforms modeled on Sarbanes-Oxley im
prove the accuracy of financial disclosure and appease the concerns of
donors without imposing insurmountable burdens on the sector. The reforms
provide a net benefit to the sector, increasing donations and ensuring that the
donations received are not inappropriately diverted to the unlawful benefit
of a few corrupt insiders.

130.

See supra Section 11.B.iii.

131.

See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.

132.

See supra Section 11.B.iii.
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